diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/sys.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/sys.c | 1893 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1893 deletions
diff --git a/libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/sys.c b/libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/sys.c deleted file mode 100644 index 6533cb97..00000000 --- a/libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/sys.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1893 +0,0 @@ -/* - * linux/kernel/sys.c - * - * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds - */ - -#include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/mm.h> -#include <linux/utsname.h> -#include <linux/mman.h> -#include <linux/smp_lock.h> -#include <linux/notifier.h> -#include <linux/reboot.h> -#include <linux/prctl.h> -#include <linux/highuid.h> -#include <linux/fs.h> -#include <linux/resource.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h> -#include <linux/kexec.h> -#include <linux/workqueue.h> -#include <linux/capability.h> -#include <linux/device.h> -#include <linux/key.h> -#include <linux/times.h> -#include <linux/posix-timers.h> -#include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/dcookies.h> -#include <linux/suspend.h> -#include <linux/tty.h> -#include <linux/signal.h> -#include <linux/cn_proc.h> -#include <linux/getcpu.h> -#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> -#include <linux/seccomp.h> -#include <linux/cpu.h> -#include <linux/ptrace.h> - -#include <linux/compat.h> -#include <linux/syscalls.h> -#include <linux/kprobes.h> -#include <linux/user_namespace.h> - -#include <asm/uaccess.h> -#include <asm/io.h> -#include <asm/unistd.h> - -#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL -# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL -# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL -# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL -# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL -# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL -# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef GET_ENDIAN -# define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef SET_ENDIAN -# define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef GET_TSC_CTL -# define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) -#endif -#ifndef SET_TSC_CTL -# define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) -#endif - -#ifndef DDE_LINUX -/* - * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for - * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past - */ - -int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; -int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; - -#ifdef CONFIG_UID16 -EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); -#endif - -/* - * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit - * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures - */ - -int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; -int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); - -/* - * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes - */ - -int C_A_D = 1; -#endif /* DDE_LINUX */ -struct pid *cad_pid; -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid); - -/* - * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off. - */ - -void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void); - -#ifndef DDE_LINUX -/* - * set the priority of a task - * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock - */ -static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); - int no_nice; - - if (pcred->uid != cred->euid && - pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { - error = -EPERM; - goto out; - } - if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { - error = -EACCES; - goto out; - } - no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); - if (no_nice) { - error = no_nice; - goto out; - } - if (error == -ESRCH) - error = 0; - set_user_nice(p, niceval); -out: - return error; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) -{ - struct task_struct *g, *p; - struct user_struct *user; - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int error = -EINVAL; - struct pid *pgrp; - - if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) - goto out; - - /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ - error = -ESRCH; - if (niceval < -20) - niceval = -20; - if (niceval > 19) - niceval = 19; - - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - switch (which) { - case PRIO_PROCESS: - if (who) - p = find_task_by_vpid(who); - else - p = current; - if (p) - error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); - break; - case PRIO_PGRP: - if (who) - pgrp = find_vpid(who); - else - pgrp = task_pgrp(current); - do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { - error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); - } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); - break; - case PRIO_USER: - user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user; - if (!who) - who = cred->uid; - else if ((who != cred->uid) && - !(user = find_user(who))) - goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ - - do_each_thread(g, p) - if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) - error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); - while_each_thread(g, p); - if (who != cred->uid) - free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ - break; - } -out_unlock: - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); -out: - return error; -} - -/* - * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will - * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that - * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) - * to stay compatible. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) -{ - struct task_struct *g, *p; - struct user_struct *user; - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; - struct pid *pgrp; - - if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) - return -EINVAL; - - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - switch (which) { - case PRIO_PROCESS: - if (who) - p = find_task_by_vpid(who); - else - p = current; - if (p) { - niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); - if (niceval > retval) - retval = niceval; - } - break; - case PRIO_PGRP: - if (who) - pgrp = find_vpid(who); - else - pgrp = task_pgrp(current); - do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { - niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); - if (niceval > retval) - retval = niceval; - } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); - break; - case PRIO_USER: - user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user; - if (!who) - who = cred->uid; - else if ((who != cred->uid) && - !(user = find_user(who))) - goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ - - do_each_thread(g, p) - if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) { - niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); - if (niceval > retval) - retval = niceval; - } - while_each_thread(g, p); - if (who != cred->uid) - free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ - break; - } -out_unlock: - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - - return retval; -} - -/** - * emergency_restart - reboot the system - * - * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks - * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in - * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is - * safe to call in interrupt context. - */ -void emergency_restart(void) -{ - machine_emergency_restart(); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart); - -void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd) -{ - blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd); - system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART; - device_shutdown(); - sysdev_shutdown(); -} - -/** - * kernel_restart - reboot the system - * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart - * or %NULL - * - * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot. - * This is not safe to call in interrupt context. - */ -void kernel_restart(char *cmd) -{ - kernel_restart_prepare(cmd); - if (!cmd) - printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n"); - else - printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd); - machine_restart(cmd); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart); - -static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state) -{ - blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, - (state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL); - system_state = state; - device_shutdown(); -} -/** - * kernel_halt - halt the system - * - * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt. - */ -void kernel_halt(void) -{ - kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT); - sysdev_shutdown(); - printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n"); - machine_halt(); -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt); - -/** - * kernel_power_off - power_off the system - * - * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off. - */ -void kernel_power_off(void) -{ - kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF); - if (pm_power_off_prepare) - pm_power_off_prepare(); - disable_nonboot_cpus(); - sysdev_shutdown(); - printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n"); - machine_power_off(); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off); -/* - * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it, - * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers - * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine. - * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here. - * - * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd, - void __user *, arg) -{ - char buffer[256]; - - /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT)) - return -EPERM; - - /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */ - if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 || - (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 && - magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A && - magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B && - magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C)) - return -EINVAL; - - /* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like - * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way. - */ - if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off) - cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT; - - lock_kernel(); - switch (cmd) { - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART: - kernel_restart(NULL); - break; - - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON: - C_A_D = 1; - break; - - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF: - C_A_D = 0; - break; - - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT: - kernel_halt(); - unlock_kernel(); - do_exit(0); - break; - - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF: - kernel_power_off(); - unlock_kernel(); - do_exit(0); - break; - - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2: - if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) { - unlock_kernel(); - return -EFAULT; - } - buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0'; - - kernel_restart(buffer); - break; - -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC: - { - int ret; - ret = kernel_kexec(); - unlock_kernel(); - return ret; - } -#endif - -#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION - case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND: - { - int ret = hibernate(); - unlock_kernel(); - return ret; - } -#endif - - default: - unlock_kernel(); - return -EINVAL; - } - unlock_kernel(); - return 0; -} - -static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct *dummy) -{ - kernel_restart(NULL); -} - -/* - * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt. - * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice - * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del. - */ -void ctrl_alt_del(void) -{ - static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad); - - if (C_A_D) - schedule_work(&cad_work); - else - kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1); -} - -/* - * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid - * or vice versa. (BSD-style) - * - * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not - * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. - * - * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its - * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing - * a security audit over a program. - * - * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be - * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be - * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. - * - * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem - * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - int retval; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - old = current_cred(); - - retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE); - if (retval) - goto error; - - retval = -EPERM; - if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { - if (old->gid == rgid || - old->egid == rgid || - capable(CAP_SETGID)) - new->gid = rgid; - else - goto error; - } - if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { - if (old->gid == egid || - old->egid == egid || - old->sgid == egid || - capable(CAP_SETGID)) - new->egid = egid; - else - goto error; - } - - if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || - (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid)) - new->sgid = new->egid; - new->fsgid = new->egid; - - return commit_creds(new); - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return retval; -} - -/* - * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS - * - * SMP: Same implicit races as above. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - int retval; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - old = current_cred(); - - retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); - if (retval) - goto error; - - retval = -EPERM; - if (capable(CAP_SETGID)) - new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid; - else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid) - new->egid = new->fsgid = gid; - else - goto error; - - return commit_creds(new); - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return retval; -} - -/* - * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID - */ -static int set_user(struct cred *new) -{ - struct user_struct *new_user; - - new_user = alloc_uid(current_user_ns(), new->uid); - if (!new_user) - return -EAGAIN; - - if (!task_can_switch_user(new_user, current)) { - free_uid(new_user); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= - current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur && - new_user != INIT_USER) { - free_uid(new_user); - return -EAGAIN; - } - - free_uid(new->user); - new->user = new_user; - return 0; -} - -/* - * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid - * or vice versa. (BSD-style) - * - * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not - * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. - * - * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its - * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing - * a security audit over a program. - * - * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be - * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be - * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - int retval; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - old = current_cred(); - - retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE); - if (retval) - goto error; - - retval = -EPERM; - if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { - new->uid = ruid; - if (old->uid != ruid && - old->euid != ruid && - !capable(CAP_SETUID)) - goto error; - } - - if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { - new->euid = euid; - if (old->uid != euid && - old->euid != euid && - old->suid != euid && - !capable(CAP_SETUID)) - goto error; - } - - if (new->uid != old->uid) { - retval = set_user(new); - if (retval < 0) - goto error; - } - if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || - (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid)) - new->suid = new->euid; - new->fsuid = new->euid; - - retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); - if (retval < 0) - goto error; - - return commit_creds(new); - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return retval; -} - -/* - * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS - * - * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program - * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal - * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets - * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people - * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() - * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to - * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - int retval; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - old = current_cred(); - - retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID); - if (retval) - goto error; - - retval = -EPERM; - if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - new->suid = new->uid = uid; - if (uid != old->uid) { - retval = set_user(new); - if (retval < 0) - goto error; - } - } else if (uid != old->uid && uid != new->suid) { - goto error; - } - - new->fsuid = new->euid = uid; - - retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); - if (retval < 0) - goto error; - - return commit_creds(new); - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return retval; -} - - -/* - * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, - * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - int retval; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - - retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES); - if (retval) - goto error; - old = current_cred(); - - retval = -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid && - ruid != old->euid && ruid != old->suid) - goto error; - if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old->uid && - euid != old->euid && euid != old->suid) - goto error; - if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && suid != old->uid && - suid != old->euid && suid != old->suid) - goto error; - } - - if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { - new->uid = ruid; - if (ruid != old->uid) { - retval = set_user(new); - if (retval < 0) - goto error; - } - } - if (euid != (uid_t) -1) - new->euid = euid; - if (suid != (uid_t) -1) - new->suid = suid; - new->fsuid = new->euid; - - retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); - if (retval < 0) - goto error; - - return commit_creds(new); - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return retval; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruid, uid_t __user *, euid, uid_t __user *, suid) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int retval; - - if (!(retval = put_user(cred->uid, ruid)) && - !(retval = put_user(cred->euid, euid))) - retval = put_user(cred->suid, suid); - - return retval; -} - -/* - * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - int retval; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - old = current_cred(); - - retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES); - if (retval) - goto error; - - retval = -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) { - if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid && - rgid != old->egid && rgid != old->sgid) - goto error; - if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old->gid && - egid != old->egid && egid != old->sgid) - goto error; - if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && sgid != old->gid && - sgid != old->egid && sgid != old->sgid) - goto error; - } - - if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) - new->gid = rgid; - if (egid != (gid_t) -1) - new->egid = egid; - if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) - new->sgid = sgid; - new->fsgid = new->egid; - - return commit_creds(new); - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return retval; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgid, gid_t __user *, egid, gid_t __user *, sgid) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int retval; - - if (!(retval = put_user(cred->gid, rgid)) && - !(retval = put_user(cred->egid, egid))) - retval = put_user(cred->sgid, sgid); - - return retval; -} - - -/* - * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This - * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at - * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when - * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - uid_t old_fsuid; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return current_fsuid(); - old = current_cred(); - old_fsuid = old->fsuid; - - if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0) - goto error; - - if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid || - uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid || - capable(CAP_SETUID)) { - if (uid != old_fsuid) { - new->fsuid = uid; - if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) - goto change_okay; - } - } - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return old_fsuid; - -change_okay: - commit_creds(new); - return old_fsuid; -} - -/* - * Samma på svenska.. - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) -{ - const struct cred *old; - struct cred *new; - gid_t old_fsgid; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return current_fsgid(); - old = current_cred(); - old_fsgid = old->fsgid; - - if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)) - goto error; - - if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid || - gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid || - capable(CAP_SETGID)) { - if (gid != old_fsgid) { - new->fsgid = gid; - goto change_okay; - } - } - -error: - abort_creds(new); - return old_fsgid; - -change_okay: - commit_creds(new); - return old_fsgid; -} - -void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) -{ - struct task_cputime cputime; - cputime_t cutime, cstime; - - thread_group_cputime(current, &cputime); - spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - cutime = current->signal->cutime; - cstime = current->signal->cstime; - spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime.utime); - tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(cputime.stime); - tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime); - tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime); -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) -{ - if (tbuf) { - struct tms tmp; - - do_sys_times(&tmp); - if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) - return -EFAULT; - } - force_successful_syscall_return(); - return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); -} - -/* - * This needs some heavy checking ... - * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully - * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. - * - * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really - * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user - * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 - * - * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX. - * LBT 04.03.94 - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) -{ - struct task_struct *p; - struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; - struct pid *pgrp; - int err; - - if (!pid) - pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); - if (!pgid) - pgid = pid; - if (pgid < 0) - return -EINVAL; - - /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock - * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM - */ - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - - err = -ESRCH; - p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) - goto out; - - err = -EINVAL; - if (!thread_group_leader(p)) - goto out; - - if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { - err = -EPERM; - if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) - goto out; - err = -EACCES; - if (p->did_exec) - goto out; - } else { - err = -ESRCH; - if (p != group_leader) - goto out; - } - - err = -EPERM; - if (p->signal->leader) - goto out; - - pgrp = task_pid(p); - if (pgid != pid) { - struct task_struct *g; - - pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); - g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); - if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) - goto out; - } - - err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); - if (err) - goto out; - - if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) { - change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); - set_task_pgrp(p, pid_nr(pgrp)); - } - - err = 0; -out: - /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - return err; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) -{ - struct task_struct *p; - struct pid *grp; - int retval; - - rcu_read_lock(); - if (!pid) - grp = task_pgrp(current); - else { - retval = -ESRCH; - p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) - goto out; - grp = task_pgrp(p); - if (!grp) - goto out; - - retval = security_task_getpgid(p); - if (retval) - goto out; - } - retval = pid_vnr(grp); -out: - rcu_read_unlock(); - return retval; -} - -#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP - -SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) -{ - return sys_getpgid(0); -} - -#endif - -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) -{ - struct task_struct *p; - struct pid *sid; - int retval; - - rcu_read_lock(); - if (!pid) - sid = task_session(current); - else { - retval = -ESRCH; - p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) - goto out; - sid = task_session(p); - if (!sid) - goto out; - - retval = security_task_getsid(p); - if (retval) - goto out; - } - retval = pid_vnr(sid); -out: - rcu_read_unlock(); - return retval; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) -{ - struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; - struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); - pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); - int err = -EPERM; - - write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ - if (group_leader->signal->leader) - goto out; - - /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the - * proposed session id. - */ - if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) - goto out; - - group_leader->signal->leader = 1; - __set_special_pids(sid); - - proc_clear_tty(group_leader); - - err = session; -out: - write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); - return err; -} - -/* - * Supplementary group IDs - */ - -/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */ -struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) }; - -struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize) -{ - struct group_info *group_info; - int nblocks; - int i; - - nblocks = (gidsetsize + NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK; - /* Make sure we always allocate at least one indirect block pointer */ - nblocks = nblocks ? : 1; - group_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*group_info) + nblocks*sizeof(gid_t *), GFP_USER); - if (!group_info) - return NULL; - group_info->ngroups = gidsetsize; - group_info->nblocks = nblocks; - atomic_set(&group_info->usage, 1); - - if (gidsetsize <= NGROUPS_SMALL) - group_info->blocks[0] = group_info->small_block; - else { - for (i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) { - gid_t *b; - b = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_USER); - if (!b) - goto out_undo_partial_alloc; - group_info->blocks[i] = b; - } - } - return group_info; - -out_undo_partial_alloc: - while (--i >= 0) { - free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]); - } - kfree(group_info); - return NULL; -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_alloc); - -void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info) -{ - if (group_info->blocks[0] != group_info->small_block) { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) - free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]); - } - kfree(group_info); -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free); - -/* export the group_info to a user-space array */ -static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist, - const struct group_info *group_info) -{ - int i; - unsigned int count = group_info->ngroups; - - for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) { - unsigned int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count); - unsigned int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist); - - if (copy_to_user(grouplist, group_info->blocks[i], len)) - return -EFAULT; - - grouplist += NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK; - count -= cp_count; - } - return 0; -} - -/* fill a group_info from a user-space array - it must be allocated already */ -static int groups_from_user(struct group_info *group_info, - gid_t __user *grouplist) -{ - int i; - unsigned int count = group_info->ngroups; - - for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) { - unsigned int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count); - unsigned int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist); - - if (copy_from_user(group_info->blocks[i], grouplist, len)) - return -EFAULT; - - grouplist += NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK; - count -= cp_count; - } - return 0; -} - -/* a simple Shell sort */ -static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info) -{ - int base, max, stride; - int gidsetsize = group_info->ngroups; - - for (stride = 1; stride < gidsetsize; stride = 3 * stride + 1) - ; /* nothing */ - stride /= 3; - - while (stride) { - max = gidsetsize - stride; - for (base = 0; base < max; base++) { - int left = base; - int right = left + stride; - gid_t tmp = GROUP_AT(group_info, right); - - while (left >= 0 && GROUP_AT(group_info, left) > tmp) { - GROUP_AT(group_info, right) = - GROUP_AT(group_info, left); - right = left; - left -= stride; - } - GROUP_AT(group_info, right) = tmp; - } - stride /= 3; - } -} - -/* a simple bsearch */ -int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp) -{ - unsigned int left, right; - - if (!group_info) - return 0; - - left = 0; - right = group_info->ngroups; - while (left < right) { - unsigned int mid = (left+right)/2; - int cmp = grp - GROUP_AT(group_info, mid); - if (cmp > 0) - left = mid + 1; - else if (cmp < 0) - right = mid; - else - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * set_groups - Change a group subscription in a set of credentials - * @new: The newly prepared set of credentials to alter - * @group_info: The group list to install - * - * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, insert it into a set - * of credentials. - */ -int set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info) -{ - int retval; - - retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info); - if (retval) - return retval; - - put_group_info(new->group_info); - groups_sort(group_info); - get_group_info(group_info); - new->group_info = group_info; - return 0; -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_groups); - -/** - * set_current_groups - Change current's group subscription - * @group_info: The group list to impose - * - * Validate a group subscription and, if valid, impose it upon current's task - * security record. - */ -int set_current_groups(struct group_info *group_info) -{ - struct cred *new; - int ret; - - new = prepare_creds(); - if (!new) - return -ENOMEM; - - ret = set_groups(new, group_info); - if (ret < 0) { - abort_creds(new); - return ret; - } - - return commit_creds(new); -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_current_groups); - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int i; - - if (gidsetsize < 0) - return -EINVAL; - - /* no need to grab task_lock here; it cannot change */ - i = cred->group_info->ngroups; - if (gidsetsize) { - if (i > gidsetsize) { - i = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - if (groups_to_user(grouplist, cred->group_info)) { - i = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - } -out: - return i; -} - -/* - * SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely - * without another task interfering. - */ - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist) -{ - struct group_info *group_info; - int retval; - - if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) - return -EPERM; - if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) - return -EINVAL; - - group_info = groups_alloc(gidsetsize); - if (!group_info) - return -ENOMEM; - retval = groups_from_user(group_info, grouplist); - if (retval) { - put_group_info(group_info); - return retval; - } - - retval = set_current_groups(group_info); - put_group_info(group_info); - - return retval; -} - -/* - * Check whether we're fsgid/egid or in the supplemental group.. - */ -int in_group_p(gid_t grp) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int retval = 1; - - if (grp != cred->fsgid) - retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp); - return retval; -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_group_p); - -int in_egroup_p(gid_t grp) -{ - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int retval = 1; - - if (grp != cred->egid) - retval = groups_search(cred->group_info, grp); - return retval; -} - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(in_egroup_p); - -DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); - -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) -{ - int errno = 0; - - down_read(&uts_sem); - if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name)) - errno = -EFAULT; - up_read(&uts_sem); - return errno; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) -{ - int errno; - char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; - - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) - return -EINVAL; - down_write(&uts_sem); - errno = -EFAULT; - if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { - struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); - - memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); - memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); - errno = 0; - } - up_write(&uts_sem); - return errno; -} - -#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) -{ - int i, errno; - struct new_utsname *u; - - if (len < 0) - return -EINVAL; - down_read(&uts_sem); - u = utsname(); - i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); - if (i > len) - i = len; - errno = 0; - if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i)) - errno = -EFAULT; - up_read(&uts_sem); - return errno; -} - -#endif - -/* - * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling - * uname() - */ -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) -{ - int errno; - char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; - - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) - return -EINVAL; - - down_write(&uts_sem); - errno = -EFAULT; - if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { - struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); - - memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); - memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); - errno = 0; - } - up_write(&uts_sem); - return errno; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) -{ - if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) - return -EINVAL; - else { - struct rlimit value; - task_lock(current->group_leader); - value = current->signal->rlim[resource]; - task_unlock(current->group_leader); - return copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; - } -} - -#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT - -/* - * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. - */ - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, - struct rlimit __user *, rlim) -{ - struct rlimit x; - if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) - return -EINVAL; - - task_lock(current->group_leader); - x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; - task_unlock(current->group_leader); - if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) - x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; - if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) - x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; - return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0; -} - -#endif - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) -{ - struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim; - int retval; - - if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) - return -EINVAL; - if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) - return -EFAULT; - if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max) - return -EINVAL; - old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; - if ((new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) - return -EPERM; - if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && new_rlim.rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) - return -EPERM; - - retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim); - if (retval) - return retval; - - if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim.rlim_cur == 0) { - /* - * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU - * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was - * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second - * instead - */ - new_rlim.rlim_cur = 1; - } - - task_lock(current->group_leader); - *old_rlim = new_rlim; - task_unlock(current->group_leader); - - if (resource != RLIMIT_CPU) - goto out; - - /* - * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error - * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a - * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of - * applications, so we live with it - */ - if (new_rlim.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) - goto out; - - update_rlimit_cpu(new_rlim.rlim_cur); -out: - return 0; -} - -/* - * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, - * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After - * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would - * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information - * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not - * measuring them yet). - * - * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have - * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word - * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't - * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading - * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those - * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a - * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. - * - * Locking: - * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH - * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded - * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with - * the siglock held. - * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and - * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one - * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else - * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the - * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just - * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. - * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal - * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> - * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. - * - */ - -static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) -{ - r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; - r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; - r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; - r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; - r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); - r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); -} - -static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) -{ - struct task_struct *t; - unsigned long flags; - cputime_t utime, stime; - struct task_cputime cputime; - - memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r); - utime = stime = cputime_zero; - - if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { - utime = task_utime(current); - stime = task_stime(current); - accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); - goto out; - } - - if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) - return; - - switch (who) { - case RUSAGE_BOTH: - case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: - utime = p->signal->cutime; - stime = p->signal->cstime; - r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; - r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; - r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; - r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; - r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; - r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; - - if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) - break; - - case RUSAGE_SELF: - thread_group_cputime(p, &cputime); - utime = cputime_add(utime, cputime.utime); - stime = cputime_add(stime, cputime.stime); - r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; - r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; - r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; - r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; - r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; - r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; - t = p; - do { - accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); - t = next_thread(t); - } while (t != p); - break; - - default: - BUG(); - } - unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); - -out: - cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime); - cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime); -} - -int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru) -{ - struct rusage r; - k_getrusage(p, who, &r); - return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) -{ - if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && - who != RUSAGE_THREAD) - return -EINVAL; - return getrusage(current, who, ru); -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) -{ - mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); - return mask; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, - unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) -{ - struct task_struct *me = current; - unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; - long error; - - error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); - if (error != -ENOSYS) - return error; - - error = 0; - switch (option) { - case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: - if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { - error = -EINVAL; - break; - } - me->pdeath_signal = arg2; - error = 0; - break; - case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: - error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: - error = get_dumpable(me->mm); - break; - case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: - if (arg2 < 0 || arg2 > 1) { - error = -EINVAL; - break; - } - set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); - error = 0; - break; - - case PR_SET_UNALIGN: - error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_UNALIGN: - error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_SET_FPEMU: - error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_FPEMU: - error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_SET_FPEXC: - error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_FPEXC: - error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_TIMING: - error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; - break; - case PR_SET_TIMING: - if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) - error = -EINVAL; - else - error = 0; - break; - - case PR_SET_NAME: - comm[sizeof(me->comm)-1] = 0; - if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, - sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) - return -EFAULT; - set_task_comm(me, comm); - return 0; - case PR_GET_NAME: - get_task_comm(comm, me); - if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, - sizeof(comm))) - return -EFAULT; - return 0; - case PR_GET_ENDIAN: - error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); - break; - case PR_SET_ENDIAN: - error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); - break; - - case PR_GET_SECCOMP: - error = prctl_get_seccomp(); - break; - case PR_SET_SECCOMP: - error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_TSC: - error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); - break; - case PR_SET_TSC: - error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); - break; - case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: - error = current->timer_slack_ns; - break; - case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: - if (arg2 <= 0) - current->timer_slack_ns = - current->default_timer_slack_ns; - else - current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; - error = 0; - break; - default: - error = -EINVAL; - break; - } - return error; -} - -SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, - struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) -{ - int err = 0; - int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); - if (cpup) - err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); - if (nodep) - err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); - return err ? -EFAULT : 0; -} - -char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff"; - -static void argv_cleanup(char **argv, char **envp) -{ - argv_free(argv); -} - -/** - * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff - * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails - * - * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown. - * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown. - */ -int orderly_poweroff(bool force) -{ - int argc; - char **argv = argv_split(GFP_ATOMIC, poweroff_cmd, &argc); - static char *envp[] = { - "HOME=/", - "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin", - NULL - }; - int ret = -ENOMEM; - struct subprocess_info *info; - - if (argv == NULL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n", - __func__, poweroff_cmd); - goto out; - } - - info = call_usermodehelper_setup(argv[0], argv, envp, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (info == NULL) { - argv_free(argv); - goto out; - } - - call_usermodehelper_setcleanup(info, argv_cleanup); - - ret = call_usermodehelper_exec(info, UMH_NO_WAIT); - - out: - if (ret && force) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: " - "forcing the issue\n"); - - /* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to - sync and poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing - if we're doing an emergency shutdown? */ - emergency_sync(); - kernel_power_off(); - } - - return ret; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff); -#endif /* DDE_LINUX */ |