1 files changed, 0 insertions, 323 deletions
diff --git a/libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/capability.c b/libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/capability.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c269aa7c..00000000
--- a/libdde_linux26/lib/src/kernel/capability.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * linux/kernel/capability.c
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1997  Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
- *
- * Integrated into 2.1.97+,  Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
- * 30 May 2002:	Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
- */
-
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/syscalls.h>
-#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-#include "cred-internals.h"
-
-#ifndef DDE_LINUX
-/*
- * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
- * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
- */
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
-
-/*
- * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
- */
-
-const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
-const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
-const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-int file_caps_enabled = 1;
-
-static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
-{
-	file_caps_enabled = 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
-#endif
-
-/*
- * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
- *
- *   http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
- */
-
-static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
-{
-	static int warned;
-	if (!warned) {
-		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
-		printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
-		       " (legacy support in use)\n",
-		       get_task_comm(name, current));
-		warned = 1;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file
- * that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without
- * the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have
- * created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but
- * with a header change to protect legacy source code from using
- * version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code
- * that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific
- * capabilities and may be doing so insecurely.
- *
- * The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+,
- * if the application is linked against it), or recompile your
- * application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go
- * away.
- */
-
-static void warn_deprecated_v2(void)
-{
-	static int warned;
-
-	if (!warned) {
-		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
-
-		printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2"
-		       " capabilities in a way that may be insecure.\n",
-		       get_task_comm(name, current));
-		warned = 1;
-	}
-}
-
-/*
- * Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag
- * array, or a negative value on error.
- */
-static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
-{
-	__u32 version;
-
-	if (get_user(version, &header->version))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	switch (version) {
-	case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
-		warn_legacy_capability_use();
-		*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
-		break;
-	case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
-		warn_deprecated_v2();
-		/*
-		 * fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2.
-		 */
-	case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3:
-		*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3;
-		break;
-	default:
-		if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
-			return -EFAULT;
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
- * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
- * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
- * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
- * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
- */
-static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
-				     kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
-		struct task_struct *target;
-
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-
-		target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
-		if (!target)
-			ret = -ESRCH;
-		else
-			ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
-
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-	} else
-		ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
- * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
- *	target pid data
- * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
- *	and inheritable capabilities that are returned
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
- */
-SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
-{
-	int ret = 0;
-	pid_t pid;
-	unsigned tocopy;
-	kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
-
-	ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
-	if (ret != 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	if (pid < 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
-	if (!ret) {
-		struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
-		unsigned i;
-
-		for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
-			kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
-			kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
-			kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
-		 * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
-		 * has the effect of making older libcap
-		 * implementations implicitly drop upper capability
-		 * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
-		 * sequence.
-		 *
-		 * This behavior is considered fail-safe
-		 * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
-		 * version of libcap will enable access to the newer
-		 * capabilities.
-		 *
-		 * An alternative would be to return an error here
-		 * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
-		 * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
-		 * before modification is attempted and the application
-		 * fails.
-		 */
-		if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
-				 * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes
- * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
- *	target pid data
- * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
- *	and inheritable capabilities
- *
- * Set capabilities for the current process only.  The ability to any other
- * process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
- *
- * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
- *
- * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
- * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
- * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
- */
-SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
-{
-	struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
-	unsigned i, tocopy;
-	kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
-	struct cred *new;
-	int ret;
-	pid_t pid;
-
-	ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
-	if (ret != 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	/* may only affect current now */
-	if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data,
-			   tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
-		effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
-		permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
-		inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
-	}
-	while (i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
-		effective.cap[i] = 0;
-		permitted.cap[i] = 0;
-		inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
-		i++;
-	}
-
-	new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
-			      &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
-
-	audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred());
-
-	return commit_creds(new);
-
-error:
-	abort_creds(new);
-	return ret;
-}
-#endif /* !DDE_LINUX */
-
-/**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
- * @cap: The capability to be tested for
- *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
- *
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
- */
-int capable(int cap)
-{
-	if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
-		printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
-		BUG();
-	}
-
-	if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
-		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
-		return 1;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);