rename libdde_linux26 into libdde-linux26 to make dpkg-source happy

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 955 deletions

diff --git a/libdde_linux26/contrib/security/commoncap.c b/libdde_linux26/contrib/security/commoncap.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cd61a5f..00000000
--- a/libdde_linux26/contrib/security/commoncap.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,955 +0,0 @@
-/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
- *
- *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- *	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- *	(at your option) any later version.
- *
- */
-
-#include <linux/capability.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/file.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/mman.h>
-#include <linux/pagemap.h>
-#include <linux/swap.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
-#include <linux/mount.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/prctl.h>
-#include <linux/securebits.h>
-
-int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-	if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-
-/**
- * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
- * @cred: The credentials to use
- * @cap: The capability to check for
- * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
- *
- * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
- * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
- *
- * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
- * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
- * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
- */
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
-		int audit)
-{
-	return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
- * @ts: The time to set
- * @tz: The timezone to set
- *
- * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
- * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
- */
-int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
-{
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
- *			   another
- * @child: The process to be accessed
- * @mode: The mode of attachment.
- *
- * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
- * granted, -ve if denied.
- */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
-{
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted,
-			  current_cred()->cap_permitted) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
-		ret = -EPERM;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
- * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
- *
- * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
- * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
- */
-int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
-{
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted,
-			  __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) &&
-	    !has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
-		ret = -EPERM;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
- * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
- * @effective: The place to record the effective set
- * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
- * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
- *
- * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
- * them to the caller.
- */
-int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
-	       kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-	const struct cred *cred;
-
-	/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	cred = __task_cred(target);
-	*effective   = cred->cap_effective;
-	*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
-	*permitted   = cred->cap_permitted;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
- * permitted set.  Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
- */
-static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
-	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
-	 * capability
-	 */
-	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
-			SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
-		return 0;
-#endif
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
- * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
- * @old: The current task's current credentials
- * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
- * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
- * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
- *
- * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
- * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new
- * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
- */
-int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
-	       const struct cred *old,
-	       const kernel_cap_t *effective,
-	       const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-	       const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-	if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
-	    !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
-			  cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
-				      old->cap_permitted)))
-		/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
-			  cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
-				      old->cap_bset)))
-		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
-	if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
-	if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	new->cap_effective   = *effective;
-	new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
-	new->cap_permitted   = *permitted;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Clear proposed capability sets for execve().
- */
-static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
-	bprm->cap_effective = false;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
-/**
- * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
- * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
- *
- * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
- * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
- * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected?
- *
- * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and
- * -ve to deny the change.
- */
-int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	int error;
-
-	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
-	       return 0;
-
-	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
-	if (error <= 0)
-		return 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
- * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
- *
- * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
- */
-int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-
-	if (!inode->i_op->removexattr)
-	       return 0;
-
-	return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
- * to a file.
- */
-static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
-					  struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-					  bool *effective)
-{
-	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
-	unsigned i;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
-		*effective = true;
-
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
-		__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
-		__u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
-
-		/*
-		 * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
-		 */
-		new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
-			(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
-			(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
-
-		if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])
-			/* insufficient to execute correctly */
-			ret = -EPERM;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
-	 * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
-	 * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
-	 */
-	return *effective ? ret : 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
- */
-int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-	__u32 magic_etc;
-	unsigned tocopy, i;
-	int size;
-	struct vfs_cap_data caps;
-
-	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
-
-	if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
-		return -ENODATA;
-
-	size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps,
-				   XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
-	if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-		/* no data, that's ok */
-		return -ENODATA;
-	if (size < 0)
-		return size;
-
-	if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
-
-	switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
-	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
-		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
-		break;
-	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
-		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
-		if (i >= tocopy)
-			break;
-		cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
-		cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
- * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
- * constructed by execve().
- */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
-{
-	struct dentry *dentry;
-	int rc = 0;
-	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
-
-	bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
-
-	if (!file_caps_enabled)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
-		return 0;
-
-	dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
-
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
-	if (rc < 0) {
-		if (rc == -EINVAL)
-			printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
-				__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
-		else if (rc == -ENODATA)
-			rc = 0;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective);
-	if (rc == -EINVAL)
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
-		       __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
-
-out:
-	dput(dentry);
-	if (rc)
-		bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
-
-	return rc;
-}
-
-#else
-int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
-{
-	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
- 	return -ENODATA;
-}
-
-static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
-{
-	bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be
- * limited to just what it already has.
- *
- * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to
- * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the
- * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.
- *
- *  Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.
- */
-static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
-{
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-	if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
-		return 0;
-#endif
-	return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
- * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
- *
- * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
- * constructed by execve().  The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
- * which won't take effect immediately.  Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
- */
-int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
-	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
-	bool effective;
-	int ret;
-
-	effective = false;
-	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
-
-	if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
-		/*
-		 * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
-		 * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
-		 * capability sets for the file.
-		 *
-		 * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
-		 */
-		if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
-			/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
-			new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
-							 old->cap_inheritable);
-		}
-		if (new->euid == 0)
-			effective = true;
-	}
-
-	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
-	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
-	 */
-	if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
-	     new->egid != old->gid ||
-	     !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
-	    bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
-		/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
-			new->euid = new->uid;
-			new->egid = new->gid;
-		}
-		if (cap_limit_ptraced_target())
-			new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
-							   old->cap_permitted);
-	}
-
-	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
-	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
-
-	/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial
-	 * task.  Thus we skip the usual capability rules
-	 */
-	if (!is_global_init(current)) {
-		if (effective)
-			new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
-		else
-			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
-	}
-	bprm->cap_effective = effective;
-
-	/*
-	 * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
-	 *
-	 * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
-	 *   1) cap_effective has all caps
-	 *   2) we are root
-	 *   3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
-	 * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
-	 *
-	 * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
-	 * that is interesting information to audit.
-	 */
-	if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
-		if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
-		    new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
-		    issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
-			ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
-			if (ret < 0)
-				return ret;
-		}
-	}
-
-	new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required
- * @bprm: The execution parameters
- *
- * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0
- * if it is not.
- *
- * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer
- * available through @bprm->cred.
- */
-int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-
-	if (cred->uid != 0) {
-		if (bprm->cap_effective)
-			return 1;
-		if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted))
-			return 1;
-	}
-
-	return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
-		cred->egid != cred->gid);
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
- * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
- * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
- * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
- * @size: The size of value
- * @flags: The replacement flag
- *
- * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
- * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
- *
- * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
- * who aren't privileged to do so.
- */
-int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
-		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
-	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
-			return -EPERM;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
- * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
- * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
- *
- * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
- * permission is granted, -ve if denied.
- *
- * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
- * aren't privileged to remove them.
- */
-int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
-{
-	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
-			return -EPERM;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
- * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
- *
- *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
- *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
- *  cleared.
- *
- *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
- *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
- *
- *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
- *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
- *
- *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
- *  never happen.
- *
- *  -astor
- *
- * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
- * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
- * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
- * effective sets will be retained.
- * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
- * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
- * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
- * files..
- * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
- */
-static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-	if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
-	    (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
-	    !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
-		cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
-		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
-	}
-	if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
-		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
-	if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
-		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
- * @new: The proposed credentials
- * @old: The current task's current credentials
- * @flags: Indications of what has changed
- *
- * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
- * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
- */
-int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
-{
-	switch (flags) {
-	case LSM_SETID_RE:
-	case LSM_SETID_ID:
-	case LSM_SETID_RES:
-		/* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
-		 * otherwise suppressed */
-		if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
-			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
-		break;
-
-	case LSM_SETID_FS:
-		/* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
-		 * otherwise suppressed
-		 *
-		 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
-		 *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
-		 */
-		if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
-			if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)
-				new->cap_effective =
-					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
-
-			if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)
-				new->cap_effective =
-					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
-							 new->cap_permitted);
-		}
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-/*
- * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
- * task_setnice, assumes that
- *   . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
- *   . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
- *   	then those actions should be allowed
- * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
- * yet with increased caps.
- * So we check for increased caps on the target process.
- */
-static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-	int is_subset;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
-				 current_cred()->cap_permitted);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
- * @p: The task to affect
- * @policy: The policy to effect
- * @lp: The parameters to the scheduling policy
- *
- * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
- * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
- */
-int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-			   struct sched_param *lp)
-{
-	return cap_safe_nice(p);
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
- * @p: The task to affect
- * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
- *
- * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
- * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
- */
-int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
-{
-	return cap_safe_nice(p);
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
- * @p: The task to affect
- * @nice: The nice value to set
- *
- * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
- * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
- */
-int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
-{
-	return cap_safe_nice(p);
-}
-
-/*
- * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP.  Attempt to remove the specified capability from
- * the current task's bounding set.  Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
- */
-static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
-{
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
-		return -EPERM;
-	if (!cap_valid(cap))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-#else
-int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-			   struct sched_param *lp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
- * @option: The process control function requested
- * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
- *
- * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
- * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
- *
- * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
- * here, other -ve on error.  If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
- * modules will consider performing the function.
- */
-int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
-		   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
-{
-	struct cred *new;
-	long error = 0;
-
-	new = prepare_creds();
-	if (!new)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	switch (option) {
-	case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
-		error = -EINVAL;
-		if (!cap_valid(arg2))
-			goto error;
-		error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
-		goto no_change;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-	case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
-		error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
-		if (error < 0)
-			goto error;
-		goto changed;
-
-	/*
-	 * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
-	 * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
-	 * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
-	 * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
-	 *
-	 * Note:
-	 *
-	 *  PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
-	 *      issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
-	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
-	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
-	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
-	 *    | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
-	 *
-	 * will ensure that the current process and all of its
-	 * children will be locked into a pure
-	 * capability-based-privilege environment.
-	 */
-	case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
-		error = -EPERM;
-		if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
-		     & (new->securebits ^ arg2))			/*[1]*/
-		    || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))	/*[2]*/
-		    || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))	/*[3]*/
-		    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
-				    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)		/*[4]*/
-			/*
-			 * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
-			 * [2] no unlocking of locks
-			 * [3] no setting of unsupported bits
-			 * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
-			 *     the "sendmail capabilities bug")
-			 */
-		    )
-			/* cannot change a locked bit */
-			goto error;
-		new->securebits = arg2;
-		goto changed;
-
-	case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
-		error = new->securebits;
-		goto no_change;
-
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
-	case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
-		if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
-			error = 1;
-		goto no_change;
-
-	case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
-		error = -EINVAL;
-		if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
-			goto error;
-		error = -EPERM;
-		if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
-			goto error;
-		if (arg2)
-			new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
-		else
-			new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
-		goto changed;
-
-	default:
-		/* No functionality available - continue with default */
-		error = -ENOSYS;
-		goto error;
-	}
-
-	/* Functionality provided */
-changed:
-	return commit_creds(new);
-
-no_change:
-	error = 0;
-error:
-	abort_creds(new);
-	return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_syslog - Determine whether syslog function is permitted
- * @type: Function requested
- *
- * Determine whether the current process is permitted to use a particular
- * syslog function, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
- */
-int cap_syslog(int type)
-{
-	if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
- * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
- * @pages: The size of the mapping
- *
- * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
- * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
- */
-int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
-{
-	int cap_sys_admin = 0;
-
-	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
-			SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
-		cap_sys_admin = 1;
-	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
-}