summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorRoland McGrath <roland@gnu.org>2000-02-04 03:21:18 +0000
committerRoland McGrath <roland@gnu.org>2000-02-04 03:21:18 +0000
commit9fd51e9b0ad33a89a83fdbbb66bd20d85f7893fb (patch)
tree8845b79f170028cb4380045c50277bbf075b5b7d /pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
Import of Linux 2.2.12 subset (ipv4 stack and related)
Diffstat (limited to 'pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c')
-rw-r--r--pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c549
1 files changed, 549 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c b/pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7a3e2618
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pfinet/linux-src/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+/*
+ * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
+ * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
+ * interface as the means of communication with the user level.
+ *
+ * The Internet Protocol (IP) module.
+ *
+ * Version: $Id: ip_input.c,v 1.37 1999/04/22 10:38:36 davem Exp $
+ *
+ * Authors: Ross Biro, <bir7@leland.Stanford.Edu>
+ * Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG>
+ * Donald Becker, <becker@super.org>
+ * Alan Cox, <Alan.Cox@linux.org>
+ * Richard Underwood
+ * Stefan Becker, <stefanb@yello.ping.de>
+ * Jorge Cwik, <jorge@laser.satlink.net>
+ * Arnt Gulbrandsen, <agulbra@nvg.unit.no>
+ *
+ *
+ * Fixes:
+ * Alan Cox : Commented a couple of minor bits of surplus code
+ * Alan Cox : Undefining IP_FORWARD doesn't include the code
+ * (just stops a compiler warning).
+ * Alan Cox : Frames with >=MAX_ROUTE record routes, strict routes or loose routes
+ * are junked rather than corrupting things.
+ * Alan Cox : Frames to bad broadcast subnets are dumped
+ * We used to process them non broadcast and
+ * boy could that cause havoc.
+ * Alan Cox : ip_forward sets the free flag on the
+ * new frame it queues. Still crap because
+ * it copies the frame but at least it
+ * doesn't eat memory too.
+ * Alan Cox : Generic queue code and memory fixes.
+ * Fred Van Kempen : IP fragment support (borrowed from NET2E)
+ * Gerhard Koerting: Forward fragmented frames correctly.
+ * Gerhard Koerting: Fixes to my fix of the above 8-).
+ * Gerhard Koerting: IP interface addressing fix.
+ * Linus Torvalds : More robustness checks
+ * Alan Cox : Even more checks: Still not as robust as it ought to be
+ * Alan Cox : Save IP header pointer for later
+ * Alan Cox : ip option setting
+ * Alan Cox : Use ip_tos/ip_ttl settings
+ * Alan Cox : Fragmentation bogosity removed
+ * (Thanks to Mark.Bush@prg.ox.ac.uk)
+ * Dmitry Gorodchanin : Send of a raw packet crash fix.
+ * Alan Cox : Silly ip bug when an overlength
+ * fragment turns up. Now frees the
+ * queue.
+ * Linus Torvalds/ : Memory leakage on fragmentation
+ * Alan Cox : handling.
+ * Gerhard Koerting: Forwarding uses IP priority hints
+ * Teemu Rantanen : Fragment problems.
+ * Alan Cox : General cleanup, comments and reformat
+ * Alan Cox : SNMP statistics
+ * Alan Cox : BSD address rule semantics. Also see
+ * UDP as there is a nasty checksum issue
+ * if you do things the wrong way.
+ * Alan Cox : Always defrag, moved IP_FORWARD to the config.in file
+ * Alan Cox : IP options adjust sk->priority.
+ * Pedro Roque : Fix mtu/length error in ip_forward.
+ * Alan Cox : Avoid ip_chk_addr when possible.
+ * Richard Underwood : IP multicasting.
+ * Alan Cox : Cleaned up multicast handlers.
+ * Alan Cox : RAW sockets demultiplex in the BSD style.
+ * Gunther Mayer : Fix the SNMP reporting typo
+ * Alan Cox : Always in group 224.0.0.1
+ * Pauline Middelink : Fast ip_checksum update when forwarding
+ * Masquerading support.
+ * Alan Cox : Multicast loopback error for 224.0.0.1
+ * Alan Cox : IP_MULTICAST_LOOP option.
+ * Alan Cox : Use notifiers.
+ * Bjorn Ekwall : Removed ip_csum (from slhc.c too)
+ * Bjorn Ekwall : Moved ip_fast_csum to ip.h (inline!)
+ * Stefan Becker : Send out ICMP HOST REDIRECT
+ * Arnt Gulbrandsen : ip_build_xmit
+ * Alan Cox : Per socket routing cache
+ * Alan Cox : Fixed routing cache, added header cache.
+ * Alan Cox : Loopback didn't work right in original ip_build_xmit - fixed it.
+ * Alan Cox : Only send ICMP_REDIRECT if src/dest are the same net.
+ * Alan Cox : Incoming IP option handling.
+ * Alan Cox : Set saddr on raw output frames as per BSD.
+ * Alan Cox : Stopped broadcast source route explosions.
+ * Alan Cox : Can disable source routing
+ * Takeshi Sone : Masquerading didn't work.
+ * Dave Bonn,Alan Cox : Faster IP forwarding whenever possible.
+ * Alan Cox : Memory leaks, tramples, misc debugging.
+ * Alan Cox : Fixed multicast (by popular demand 8))
+ * Alan Cox : Fixed forwarding (by even more popular demand 8))
+ * Alan Cox : Fixed SNMP statistics [I think]
+ * Gerhard Koerting : IP fragmentation forwarding fix
+ * Alan Cox : Device lock against page fault.
+ * Alan Cox : IP_HDRINCL facility.
+ * Werner Almesberger : Zero fragment bug
+ * Alan Cox : RAW IP frame length bug
+ * Alan Cox : Outgoing firewall on build_xmit
+ * A.N.Kuznetsov : IP_OPTIONS support throughout the kernel
+ * Alan Cox : Multicast routing hooks
+ * Jos Vos : Do accounting *before* call_in_firewall
+ * Willy Konynenberg : Transparent proxying support
+ *
+ *
+ *
+ * To Fix:
+ * IP fragmentation wants rewriting cleanly. The RFC815 algorithm is much more efficient
+ * and could be made very efficient with the addition of some virtual memory hacks to permit
+ * the allocation of a buffer that can then be 'grown' by twiddling page tables.
+ * Output fragmentation wants updating along with the buffer management to use a single
+ * interleaved copy algorithm so that fragmenting has a one copy overhead. Actual packet
+ * output should probably do its own fragmentation at the UDP/RAW layer. TCP shouldn't cause
+ * fragmentation anyway.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/system.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/config.h>
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/sockios.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/inet.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/etherdevice.h>
+
+#include <net/snmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/protocol.h>
+#include <net/route.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/arp.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/raw.h>
+#include <net/checksum.h>
+#include <linux/ip_fw.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MASQUERADE
+#include <net/ip_masq.h>
+#endif
+#include <linux/firewall.h>
+#include <linux/mroute.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+
+/*
+ * SNMP management statistics
+ */
+
+struct ip_mib ip_statistics={2,IPDEFTTL,}; /* Forwarding=No, Default TTL=64 */
+
+
+/*
+ * Handle the issuing of an ioctl() request
+ * for the ip device. This is scheduled to
+ * disappear
+ */
+
+int ip_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ switch(cmd)
+ {
+ default:
+ return(-EINVAL);
+ }
+}
+
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IP_TRANSPARENT_PROXY) && !defined(CONFIG_IP_ALWAYS_DEFRAG)
+#define CONFIG_IP_ALWAYS_DEFRAG 1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * 0 - deliver
+ * 1 - block
+ */
+static __inline__ int icmp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int type;
+
+ type = skb->h.icmph->type;
+ if (type < 32)
+ return test_bit(type, &sk->tp_pinfo.tp_raw4.filter);
+
+ /* Do not block unknown ICMP types */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process Router Attention IP option
+ */
+int ip_call_ra_chain(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct ip_ra_chain *ra;
+ u8 protocol = skb->nh.iph->protocol;
+ struct sock *last = NULL;
+
+ for (ra = ip_ra_chain; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ struct sock *sk = ra->sk;
+ if (sk && sk->num == protocol) {
+ if (skb->nh.iph->frag_off & htons(IP_MF|IP_OFFSET)) {
+ skb = ip_defrag(skb);
+ if (skb == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (last) {
+ struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (skb2)
+ raw_rcv(last, skb2);
+ }
+ last = sk;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (last) {
+ raw_rcv(last, skb);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deliver IP Packets to the higher protocol layers.
+ */
+int ip_local_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct iphdr *iph = skb->nh.iph;
+ struct inet_protocol *ipprot;
+ struct sock *raw_sk=NULL;
+ unsigned char hash;
+ int flag = 0;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_IP_ALWAYS_DEFRAG
+ /*
+ * Reassemble IP fragments.
+ */
+
+ if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_MF|IP_OFFSET)) {
+ skb = ip_defrag(skb);
+ if (!skb)
+ return 0;
+ iph = skb->nh.iph;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MASQUERADE
+ /*
+ * Do we need to de-masquerade this packet?
+ */
+ {
+ int ret;
+ /*
+ * Some masq modules can re-inject packets if
+ * bad configured.
+ */
+
+ if((IPCB(skb)->flags&IPSKB_MASQUERADED)) {
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "ip_input(): demasq recursion detected. Check masq modules configuration\n");
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = ip_fw_demasquerade(&skb);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ret) {
+ iph=skb->nh.iph;
+ IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_MASQUERADED;
+ dst_release(skb->dst);
+ skb->dst = NULL;
+ if (ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, skb->dev)) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return skb->dst->input(skb);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Point into the IP datagram, just past the header.
+ */
+
+ skb->h.raw = skb->nh.raw + iph->ihl*4;
+
+ /*
+ * Deliver to raw sockets. This is fun as to avoid copies we want to make no
+ * surplus copies.
+ *
+ * RFC 1122: SHOULD pass TOS value up to the transport layer.
+ * -> It does. And not only TOS, but all IP header.
+ */
+
+ /* Note: See raw.c and net/raw.h, RAWV4_HTABLE_SIZE==MAX_INET_PROTOS */
+ hash = iph->protocol & (MAX_INET_PROTOS - 1);
+
+ /*
+ * If there maybe a raw socket we must check - if not we don't care less
+ */
+
+ if((raw_sk = raw_v4_htable[hash]) != NULL) {
+ struct sock *sknext = NULL;
+ struct sk_buff *skb1;
+ raw_sk = raw_v4_lookup(raw_sk, iph->protocol, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, skb->dev->ifindex);
+ if(raw_sk) { /* Any raw sockets */
+ do {
+ /* Find the next */
+ sknext = raw_v4_lookup(raw_sk->next, iph->protocol,
+ iph->saddr, iph->daddr, skb->dev->ifindex);
+ if (iph->protocol != IPPROTO_ICMP || !icmp_filter(raw_sk, skb)) {
+ if (sknext == NULL)
+ break;
+ skb1 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if(skb1)
+ {
+ raw_rcv(raw_sk, skb1);
+ }
+ }
+ raw_sk = sknext;
+ } while(raw_sk!=NULL);
+
+ /* Here either raw_sk is the last raw socket, or NULL if
+ * none. We deliver to the last raw socket AFTER the
+ * protocol checks as it avoids a surplus copy.
+ */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * skb->h.raw now points at the protocol beyond the IP header.
+ */
+
+ for (ipprot = (struct inet_protocol *)inet_protos[hash];ipprot != NULL;ipprot=(struct inet_protocol *)ipprot->next)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *skb2;
+
+ if (ipprot->protocol != iph->protocol)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * See if we need to make a copy of it. This will
+ * only be set if more than one protocol wants it.
+ * and then not for the last one. If there is a pending
+ * raw delivery wait for that
+ */
+
+ if (ipprot->copy || raw_sk)
+ {
+ skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if(skb2==NULL)
+ continue;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skb2 = skb;
+ }
+ flag = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Pass on the datagram to each protocol that wants it,
+ * based on the datagram protocol. We should really
+ * check the protocol handler's return values here...
+ */
+
+ ipprot->handler(skb2, ntohs(iph->tot_len) - (iph->ihl * 4));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * All protocols checked.
+ * If this packet was a broadcast, we may *not* reply to it, since that
+ * causes (proven, grin) ARP storms and a leakage of memory (i.e. all
+ * ICMP reply messages get queued up for transmission...)
+ */
+
+ if(raw_sk!=NULL) /* Shift to last raw user */
+ {
+ raw_rcv(raw_sk, skb);
+
+ }
+ else if (!flag) /* Free and report errors */
+ {
+ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PROT_UNREACH, 0);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main IP Receive routine.
+ */
+int ip_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct device *dev, struct packet_type *pt)
+{
+ struct iphdr *iph = skb->nh.iph;
+#ifdef CONFIG_FIREWALL
+ int fwres;
+ u16 rport;
+#endif /* CONFIG_FIREWALL */
+
+ /*
+ * When the interface is in promisc. mode, drop all the crap
+ * that it receives, do not try to analyse it.
+ */
+ if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OTHERHOST)
+ goto drop;
+
+ ip_statistics.IpInReceives++;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC1122: 3.1.2.2 MUST silently discard any IP frame that fails the checksum.
+ *
+ * Is the datagram acceptable?
+ *
+ * 1. Length at least the size of an ip header
+ * 2. Version of 4
+ * 3. Checksums correctly. [Speed optimisation for later, skip loopback checksums]
+ * 4. Doesn't have a bogus length
+ */
+
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr))
+ goto inhdr_error;
+ if (iph->ihl < 5 || iph->version != 4 || ip_fast_csum((u8 *)iph, iph->ihl) != 0)
+ goto inhdr_error;
+
+ {
+ __u32 len = ntohs(iph->tot_len);
+ if (skb->len < len)
+ goto inhdr_error;
+
+ /*
+ * Our transport medium may have padded the buffer out. Now we know it
+ * is IP we can trim to the true length of the frame.
+ * Note this now means skb->len holds ntohs(iph->tot_len).
+ */
+
+ __skb_trim(skb, len);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ALWAYS_DEFRAG
+ /* Won't send ICMP reply, since skb->dst == NULL. --RR */
+ if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_MF|IP_OFFSET)) {
+ skb = ip_defrag(skb);
+ if (!skb)
+ return 0;
+ iph = skb->nh.iph;
+ ip_send_check(iph);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FIREWALL
+ /*
+ * See if the firewall wants to dispose of the packet.
+ *
+ * We can't do ICMP reply or local delivery before routing,
+ * so we delay those decisions until after route. --RR
+ */
+ fwres = call_in_firewall(PF_INET, dev, iph, &rport, &skb);
+ if (fwres < FW_ACCEPT && fwres != FW_REJECT)
+ goto drop;
+ iph = skb->nh.iph;
+#endif /* CONFIG_FIREWALL */
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise the virtual path cache for the packet. It describes
+ * how the packet travels inside Linux networking.
+ */
+ if (skb->dst == NULL) {
+ if (ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev))
+ goto drop;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IS_SLOW
+ if (net_cpu_congestion > 10 && !(iph->tos&IPTOS_RELIABILITY) &&
+ IPTOS_PREC(iph->tos) < IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL) {
+ goto drop;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE
+ if (skb->dst->tclassid) {
+ u32 idx = skb->dst->tclassid;
+ ip_rt_acct[idx&0xFF].o_packets++;
+ ip_rt_acct[idx&0xFF].o_bytes+=skb->len;
+ ip_rt_acct[(idx>>16)&0xFF].i_packets++;
+ ip_rt_acct[(idx>>16)&0xFF].i_bytes+=skb->len;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (iph->ihl > 5) {
+ struct ip_options *opt;
+
+ /* It looks as overkill, because not all
+ IP options require packet mangling.
+ But it is the easiest for now, especially taking
+ into account that combination of IP options
+ and running sniffer is extremely rare condition.
+ --ANK (980813)
+ */
+
+ skb = skb_cow(skb, skb_headroom(skb));
+ if (skb == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ iph = skb->nh.iph;
+
+ skb->ip_summed = 0;
+ if (ip_options_compile(NULL, skb))
+ goto inhdr_error;
+
+ opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
+ if (opt->srr) {
+ struct in_device *in_dev = dev->ip_ptr;
+ if (in_dev && !IN_DEV_SOURCE_ROUTE(in_dev)) {
+ if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev) && net_ratelimit())
+ printk(KERN_INFO "source route option %d.%d.%d.%d -> %d.%d.%d.%d\n",
+ NIPQUAD(iph->saddr), NIPQUAD(iph->daddr));
+ goto drop;
+ }
+ if (ip_options_rcv_srr(skb))
+ goto drop;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FIREWALL
+#ifdef CONFIG_IP_TRANSPARENT_PROXY
+ if (fwres == FW_REDIRECT && (IPCB(skb)->redirport = rport) != 0)
+ return ip_local_deliver(skb);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IP_TRANSPARENT_PROXY */
+
+ if (fwres == FW_REJECT) {
+ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
+ goto drop;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_FIREWALL */
+
+ return skb->dst->input(skb);
+
+inhdr_error:
+ ip_statistics.IpInHdrErrors++;
+drop:
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return(0);
+}
+