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Diffstat (limited to 'open_issues/translators_set_up_by_untrusted_users.mdwn')
| -rw-r--r-- | open_issues/translators_set_up_by_untrusted_users.mdwn | 21 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/open_issues/translators_set_up_by_untrusted_users.mdwn b/open_issues/translators_set_up_by_untrusted_users.mdwn index 36fe5438..97f48bba 100644 --- a/open_issues/translators_set_up_by_untrusted_users.mdwn +++ b/open_issues/translators_set_up_by_untrusted_users.mdwn @@ -324,3 +324,24 @@ do bear some similarity with the issue we're discussing here. <youpi> it should be one's normal right to change the view one has of it <antrik> we discussed that once actually I believe... <antrik> err... private namespaces I mean + +IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2011-09-10: + + <cjuner_> I am rereading Neal Walfield's and Marcus Brinkman's critique of + the hurd on mach. One of the arguments is that a file system may be + malicious (by DoS its clients with infinitely deep directory + hierarchies). Is there an answer to that that does not require programs + to be programmed defensively against such possibilities? + +IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2011-09-14: + + <antrik> cjuner: regarding malicious filesystems: the answer is to do + exactly the same as FUSE on Linux: don't follow translators set up by + untrusted users by default + <cjuner> antrik, but are legacy programs somehow protected? What about + executing `find`? Or is GNU's find somehow protected from that? + <antrik> cjuner: I'm talking about a global policy + <cjuner> antrik, and who would implement that policy? + <antrik> cjuner: either glibc or the parent translators + +Continued discussion about [[resource_management_problems/pagers]]. |