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diff --git a/open_issues/exec.mdwn b/open_issues/exec.mdwn
index ff3fccf..fe70123 100644
--- a/open_issues/exec.mdwn
+++ b/open_issues/exec.mdwn
@@ -10,7 +10,10 @@ License|/fdl]]."]]"""]]
[[!tag open_issue_hurd]]
-IRC, unknown channel, unknown date.
+[[!toc]]
+
+
+# IRC, unknown channel, unknown date.
<youpi> oh my, disabling gzip/bzip2 support makes apt preconfigure hang
<youpi> support in exec* I meant
@@ -18,6 +21,50 @@ IRC, unknown channel, unknown date.
<youpi> now a funny bug: if I disable gzip/bzip2 support from exec
<youpi> trying to run a zero-byte file hangs
+
+## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-08-01
+
+ <teythoon> uh, all the non trivial exec server code has #ifdef'd BFD code
+ all over it and it looks like that isn't even used anymore
+ <teythoon> that's too bad actually, I figured out how to get the values
+ from BFD, not so for the other elf parser that is used instead
+
+
+## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-08-05
+
+ <teythoon> btw, there is a Debian bug concerning zipped executables. now
+ I'm not sure if I understood the problem, but gziped and bzip2ed
+ executables work for me
+ <teythoon> (not that I'm a big fan of that particular feature)
+ <youpi> iirc these somehow got fixed yes
+ <youpi> something like a previous out of bound access
+ <teythoon> the exec server contains lot's of code that is unused and
+ probably bit rot (#ifdef BFD) or otherwise ignored (#if 0)
+ <youpi> yes :/
+ <teythoon> and there's gunzipping and bunzip2ing, which we probably don't
+ want anyway
+ <pinotree> why not?
+ <teythoon> we should strip all that from exec and start adding features
+ <teythoon> pinotree: b/c it's slow and the gain is questionable
+ <teythoon> it breaks mmapping the code in
+ <teythoon> exec/exec.c is huge (~2300 lines) and complex and it is an
+ essential server
+ <teythoon> and I wonder if the unzipping is done securely, e. g. if it's
+ not possible to crash exec with an maliciously compressed executable
+
+
+## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-09-12
+
+ <rekado> The zip code in hurd/exec/ looks really complicated; does it
+ really just unpack zipped files in memory (which could be replaced by
+ library calls) or is there something else going on?
+ <braunr> rekado:
+ http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-hurd/2013-08/msg00049.html
+ <rekado> braunr: interesting. Thanks.
+ <rekado> Does this mean that the "small hack entry" on the contributing
+ page to use libz and libbz2 in exec is no longer valid?
+ <braunr> probably
+
---
May want to have a look at using BFD / libiberty/simpleobject.