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Diffstat (limited to 'open_issues/exec.mdwn')
| -rw-r--r-- | open_issues/exec.mdwn | 49 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/open_issues/exec.mdwn b/open_issues/exec.mdwn index ff3fccf5..fe70123d 100644 --- a/open_issues/exec.mdwn +++ b/open_issues/exec.mdwn @@ -10,7 +10,10 @@ License|/fdl]]."]]"""]] [[!tag open_issue_hurd]] -IRC, unknown channel, unknown date. +[[!toc]] + + +# IRC, unknown channel, unknown date. <youpi> oh my, disabling gzip/bzip2 support makes apt preconfigure hang <youpi> support in exec* I meant @@ -18,6 +21,50 @@ IRC, unknown channel, unknown date. <youpi> now a funny bug: if I disable gzip/bzip2 support from exec <youpi> trying to run a zero-byte file hangs + +## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-08-01 + + <teythoon> uh, all the non trivial exec server code has #ifdef'd BFD code + all over it and it looks like that isn't even used anymore + <teythoon> that's too bad actually, I figured out how to get the values + from BFD, not so for the other elf parser that is used instead + + +## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-08-05 + + <teythoon> btw, there is a Debian bug concerning zipped executables. now + I'm not sure if I understood the problem, but gziped and bzip2ed + executables work for me + <teythoon> (not that I'm a big fan of that particular feature) + <youpi> iirc these somehow got fixed yes + <youpi> something like a previous out of bound access + <teythoon> the exec server contains lot's of code that is unused and + probably bit rot (#ifdef BFD) or otherwise ignored (#if 0) + <youpi> yes :/ + <teythoon> and there's gunzipping and bunzip2ing, which we probably don't + want anyway + <pinotree> why not? + <teythoon> we should strip all that from exec and start adding features + <teythoon> pinotree: b/c it's slow and the gain is questionable + <teythoon> it breaks mmapping the code in + <teythoon> exec/exec.c is huge (~2300 lines) and complex and it is an + essential server + <teythoon> and I wonder if the unzipping is done securely, e. g. if it's + not possible to crash exec with an maliciously compressed executable + + +## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-09-12 + + <rekado> The zip code in hurd/exec/ looks really complicated; does it + really just unpack zipped files in memory (which could be replaced by + library calls) or is there something else going on? + <braunr> rekado: + http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-hurd/2013-08/msg00049.html + <rekado> braunr: interesting. Thanks. + <rekado> Does this mean that the "small hack entry" on the contributing + page to use libz and libbz2 in exec is no longer valid? + <braunr> probably + --- May want to have a look at using BFD / libiberty/simpleobject. |