Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
* random/gnupg-random.c (mix_pool): Store the first hash at the end of
the pool.
--
This fixes a long standing bug (since 1998) in Libgcrypt and GnuPG.
An attacker who obtains 580 bytes of the random number from the
standard RNG can trivially predict the next 20 bytes of output.
The bug was found and reported by Felix Dörre and Vladimir Klebanov,
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. A paper describing the problem in
detail will shortly be published.
This is a port of c6dbfe89 from the GnuPG classic branch.
CVE-id: CVE-2016-6313
|
|
random: Fix compiler warnings.
* random/gnupg-random.c: Use byte instead of char.
* random/gnupg-rmd.h (rmd160_mixblock): Use byte instead of char.
* random/gnupg-rmd.c (rmd160_mixblock): Likewise.
* random/gnupg-rmd.c: Place #ifdef __HURD__ earlier to avoid warnings.
|
|
* random/gnupg-random.c (read_pool): Fix typo in comment.
|
|
Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
|
|
Move the random translator to its own subdirectory 'random'.
This is the last commit to this repository. Development of the random
translator will continue in the main Hurd repository.
|