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Diffstat (limited to 'proc')
-rw-r--r--proc/mgt.c32
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/proc/mgt.c b/proc/mgt.c
index 283e660b..df16db3d 100644
--- a/proc/mgt.c
+++ b/proc/mgt.c
@@ -408,8 +408,6 @@ S_proc_exception_raise (mach_port_t excport,
err = proc_exception_raise (e->forwardport,
reply, reply_type, MACH_SEND_NOTIFY,
thread, task, exception, code, subcode);
- mach_port_deallocate (mach_task_self (), thread);
- mach_port_deallocate (mach_task_self (), task);
switch (err)
{
@@ -422,13 +420,15 @@ S_proc_exception_raise (mach_port_t excport,
dequeue that message. */
err = thread_set_state (thread, e->flavor, e->thread_state, e->statecnt);
ports_port_deref (e);
+ mach_port_deallocate (mach_task_self (), thread);
+ mach_port_deallocate (mach_task_self (), task);
return MIG_NO_REPLY;
default:
/* Some unexpected error in forwarding the message. */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
- case MACH_SEND_INVALID_NOTIFY:
+ case MACH_SEND_NOTIFY_IN_PROGRESS:
/* The port's queue is full, meaning the thread didn't receive
the exception message we forwarded last time it faulted.
Declare that signal thread hopeless and the task crashed. */
@@ -447,6 +447,32 @@ S_proc_exception_raise (mach_port_t excport,
died with SIGNO. */
task_terminate (task);
ports_port_deref (e);
+
+ /* In the MACH_SEND_NOTIFY_IN_PROGRESS case, the kernel did a
+ pseudo-receive of the RPC request message that may have added user
+ refs to these send rights. But we have lost track because the MiG
+ stub did not save the message buffer that was modified by the
+ pseudo-receive.
+
+ Fortunately, we can be sure that we don't need the THREAD send
+ right for anything since this task is now dead; there would be a
+ potential race here with another exception_raise message arriving
+ with the same thread, but we expect that this won't happen since
+ the thread will still be waiting for our reply. XXX We have no
+ secure knowledge that this is really from the kernel, so a
+ malicious user could confuse us and induce a race where we clobber
+ another port put on the THREAD name after the destroy; also, a
+ user just doing thread_set_state et al could arrange that we get a
+ second legitimate exception_raise for the same thread and have the
+ first race mentioned above!
+
+ There are all manner of race problems if we destroy the TASK
+ right. Fortunately, since we've terminated the task we know that
+ we will shortly be getting a dead-name notifiction and that will
+ call mach_port_destroy in TASK when it is safe to do so. */
+
+ mach_port_destroy (mach_task_self (), thread);
+
return 0;
}