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In the topic of *code analysis* or *program analysis* ([[!wikipedia
Program_analysis_(computer_science) desc="Wikipedia article"]]), there is
static code analysis ([[!wikipedia Static_code_analysis desc="Wikipedia
article"]]) and dynamic program analysis ([[!wikipedia Dynamic_program_analysis
desc="Wikipedia article"]]). This topic overlaps with [[performance
analysis|service_solahart_jakarta_selatan__082122541663/performance]], [[service_solahart_jakarta_selatan__082122541663/formal_verification]], as well as general
[[service_solahart_jakarta_selatan__082122541663/debugging]].
[[!toc]]
# Bounty
There is a [[!FF_project 276]][[!tag bounty]] on some of these tasks.
# Static
* [[service_solahart_jakarta_selatan__082122541663/Gcc]]'s warnings. Yes, really.
* GCC plugins can be used for additional semantic analysis. For example,
, and search for *kernel context* in
the comments.
* Have GCC make use of [[RPC]]/[[microkernel/mach/MIG]] *in*/*out*
specifiers, and have it emit useful warnings in case these are pointing
to uninitialized data (for *in* only).
* [[!wikipedia List_of_tools_for_static_code_analysis]]
* [Engineering zero-defect software](http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=4340), Eric
S. Raymond, 2012-05-13
* [Static Source Code Analysis Tools for C](http://spinroot.com/static/)
* [Cppcheck](http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/cppcheck/)
For example, [Debian's hurd_20110319-2
package](http://qa.debian.org/daca/cppcheck/sid/hurd_20110319-2.html)
(Samuel Thibault, 2011-08-05: *I had a look at those, some are spurious;
the realloc issues are for real*).
* Coccinelle
*
*
Has already been used for finding and fixing [[!message-id desc="double
mutex unlocking issues"
"1355701890-29227-1-git-send-email-tipecaml@gmail.com"]].
* [clang](http://www.google.com/search?q=clang+analysis)
*
*
* [Linux' sparse](https://sparse.wiki.kernel.org/)
*
*
* [Smatch](http://smatch.sourceforge.net/)
* [Parfait](http://labs.oracle.com/projects/parfait/)
*
* [Saturn](http://saturn.stanford.edu/)
* [Flawfinder](http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/)
* [sixgill](http://sixgill.org/)
* [s-spider](http://code.google.com/p/s-spider/)
* [CIL (C Intermediate Language)](http://kerneis.github.com/cil/)
* [Frama-C](http://frama-c.com/)
btw, I've been looking at http://frama-c.com/ lately
it's a theorem prover for c/c++
oh nice
I think it's most impressive, it works on the hurd (aptitude
install frama-c o_O)
*and it works
"Simple things should be simple,
complex things should be possible."
:)
looks great
even the gui is awesome, allows one to browse source code in
a very impressive way
clear separation between value changes, dependencies, side
effects
we could have plugins for stuff like ports
handles concurrency oO
so you want to use Frame-C to analyze the whole Hurd code
base?
nalaginrut: well, frama-c looks "able" to assist in
analyzing the Hurd, yes
nalaginrut: but theorem proving is a manual process, one
needs to guide the prover
nalaginrut: b/c some stuff is not decideable
I ask this because I can imagine how to analyze Linux
since all the code is in a directory. But Hurd's codes are
distributed to many other projects
that's not a problem
each server can be analyzed separately
braunr: also, each "entry point"
alright, but sounds a big work
it is
otherwise, formal verification would be widespread :)
that, and most tools are horrible to use, frama-c is really
an exception in this regard
* [Coverity](http://www.coverity.com/) (nonfree)
* If you want access, speak up in #hurd or on the mailing list.
* IRC, OFTC, #debian-hurd, 2014-02-03
btw, did you consider adding hurd and mach to to detect bugs automatically?
I found lots of bugs in gnash, ipmitool and sysvinit when I
started scanning those projects. :)
i did some static analysis work, i haven't used coverty
but free tools for that
i think thomas wanted to look into coverty though
quite easy to set up, but you need to download and run a
non-free tarball on the build host.
does that tar ball contains binary code ?
that'd be a show stopper for the hurd of course
did not investigate. I just put it in a contained virtual
machine.
did not want it on my laptop. :)
prefer free software here. :)
but I did not have to "accept license", at least. :)
* IRC, OFTC, #debian-hurd, 2014-02-05
ah, cool.
is now in place. :)
[[microkernel/mach/gnumach/projects/clean_up_the_code]],
*Code_Analysis, Coverity*.
* [Splint](http://www.splint.org/)
* IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2011-12-04
has anyone used splint on hurd?
this is tool for statically checking C programs
seems I made it work
## Hurd-specific Applications
* [[Port Sequence Numbers|microkernel/mach/ipc/sequence_numbering]]. If
these are used, care must be taken to update them reliably, [[!message-id
"1123688017.3905.22.camel@buko.sinrega.org"]]. This could be checked by a
static analysis tool.
* [[service_solahart_jakarta_selatan__082122541663/glibc]]'s [[glibc/critical_section]]s.
# Dynamic
* [[community/gsoc/project_ideas/Valgrind]]
* glibc's `libmcheck`
* Used by GDB, for example.
* Is not thread-safe, [[!sourceware_PR 6547]], [[!sourceware_PR 9939]],
[[!sourceware_PR 12751]], [[!stackoverflow_question 314931]].
*
*
*
*
* `MALLOC_CHECK_`/`MALLOC_PERTURB_`
* IRC, freenode, #glibc, 2011-09-28
two things you can do -- there is an environment
variable (DEBUG_MALLOC_ iirc?) that can be set to 2 to make
ptmalloc (glibc's allocator) more forceful and verbose wrt error
checking
another is to grab a copy of Tor's source tree and copy
out OpenBSD's allocator (its a clearly-identifyable file in the
tree); LD_PRELOAD it or link it into your app, it is even more
aggressive about detecting memory misuse.
third, Red hat has a gdb python plugin that can
instrument glibc's heap structure. its kinda handy, might help?
MALLOC_CHECK_ was the envvar you want, sorry.
* [`MALLOC_PERTURB_`](http://udrepper.livejournal.com/11429.html)
*
* In context of [[!message-id
"1341350006-2499-1-git-send-email-rbraun@sceen.net"]]/the `alloca` issue
mentioned in [[gnumach_page_cache_policy]]:
IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2012-07-08:
braunr: there's actually already an ifdef REDZONE in libthreads
It's `RED_ZONE`.
except it seems clumsy :)
ah, no, the libthreads code properly sets the guard, just for
grow-up stacks
* GCC, LLVM/clang: [[Address Sanitizer (asan), Memory Sanitizer (msan),
Thread Sanitizer (tasn), Undefined Behavor Sanitizer (ubsan), ...|service_solahart_jakarta_selatan__082122541663/_san]]
* [GCC plugins](http://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/plugins)
* [CTraps](https://github.com/blucia0a/CTraps-gcc)
> CTraps is a gcc plugin and runtime library that inserts calls to runtime
> library functions just before shared memory accesses in parallel/concurrent
> code.
>
> The purpose of this plugin is to expose information about when and how threads
> communicate with one another to programmers for the purpose of debugging and
> performance tuning. The overhead of the instrumentation and runtime code is
> very low -- often low enough for always-on use in production code. In a series
> of initial experiments the overhead was 0-10% in many important cases.
* Input fuzzing
Not a new topic; has been used (and papers published?) for early [[UNIX]]
tools. What about some [[RPC]] fuzzing?
*
*
* [Jones: system call abuse](http://lwn.net/Articles/414273/), Dave
Jones, 2010.
* [Trinity: A Linux kernel fuzz tester (and then
some)](http://www.socallinuxexpo.org/scale11x/presentations/trinity-linux-kernel-fuzz-tester-and-then-some),
Dave Jones, The Eleventh Annual Southern California Linux Expo, 2013.
* Mayhem, *an automatic bug finding system*
IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-06-29:
started reading the mayhem paper referenced here
http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2013/06/msg00720.html
that's nice work, they are doing symbolic execution of x86
binary code, that's effectively model checking with some specialized
formulas
(too bad the mayhem code isn't available, damn those
academic people keeping the good stuff to themselvs...)
(and I really think that's bad practice, how should anyone
reproduce their results? that's not how science works imho...)