[[!meta copyright="Copyright © 2010, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc."]] [[!meta license="""[[!toggle id="license" text="GFDL 1.2+"]][[!toggleable id="license" text="Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled [[GNU Free Documentation License|/fdl]]."]]"""]] [[!tag open_issue_hurd]] [[!toc]] # IRC, unknown channel, unknown date. oh my, disabling gzip/bzip2 support makes apt preconfigure hang support in exec* I meant now a funny bug: if I disable gzip/bzip2 support from exec trying to run a zero-byte file hangs Justus: This doesn't seem to be an issue anymore (2013-09-08): % touch empty % chmod +x empty % ./empty zsh: exec format error: ./empty % bash $ ./empty $ Also I've never encountered a problem with apt. ## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-08-01 uh, all the non trivial exec server code has #ifdef'd BFD code all over it and it looks like that isn't even used anymore that's too bad actually, I figured out how to get the values from BFD, not so for the other elf parser that is used instead ## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-08-05 btw, there is a Debian bug concerning zipped executables. now I'm not sure if I understood the problem, but gziped and bzip2ed executables work for me (not that I'm a big fan of that particular feature) iirc these somehow got fixed yes something like a previous out of bound access the exec server contains lot's of code that is unused and probably bit rot (#ifdef BFD) or otherwise ignored (#if 0) yes :/ and there's gunzipping and bunzip2ing, which we probably don't want anyway why not? we should strip all that from exec and start adding features pinotree: b/c it's slow and the gain is questionable it breaks mmapping the code in exec/exec.c is huge (~2300 lines) and complex and it is an essential server and I wonder if the unzipping is done securely, e. g. if it's not possible to crash exec with an maliciously compressed executable ## IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2013-09-12 The zip code in hurd/exec/ looks really complicated; does it really just unpack zipped files in memory (which could be replaced by library calls) or is there something else going on? rekado: http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-hurd/2013-08/msg00049.html braunr: interesting. Thanks. Does this mean that the "small hack entry" on the contributing page to use libz and libbz2 in exec is no longer valid? probably --- May want to have a look at using BFD / libiberty/simpleobject. Justus: The BFD code has been removed from the exec server.